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Policymakers continue to debate the merits of opening emerging market financial sectors to
foreign ownership. A comparison of the 1995-2000 performance of foreign and domestic banks
in select Latin American countries reveals that while foreign banks differed little from their
domestic counterparts in overall financial condition, they showed more robust loan growth, a
more aggressive response to asset quality deterioration, and a greater ability to absorb losses—
characteristics that could help to strengthen the financial systems of their host countries.
In the second half of the 1990s, foreign banks signifi-
cantly increased their ownership shares of emerging
market banking systems. Contributing to this increase
were moves by local banking sectors to recapitalize in
the wake of financial crises, as well as the broader
industry trends of consolidation, privatization, and lib-
eralization. These forces have helped bring about an
especially sharp expansion of the foreign bank presence
in Latin America and Eastern Europe, where foreign
institutions now account for a striking 50 percent or
more of system assets in a number of countries.
Foreign ownership of banks in emerging markets is
often thought to improve overall bank soundness, 
especially when the foreign parent banks belong to well-
regulated financial systems and are themselves healthy.
Such parent banks are expected to provide greater access
to the capital and liquidity that bolster balance sheet
strength, and to transfer to local banks the skills and
technology that enhance risk management and internal
controls.  More broadly, a foreign bank presence is
expected to fortify emerging market financial systems by
encouraging higher standards in auditing, accounting and
disclosure, credit risk underwriting, and supervision. 
But how important a role do foreign banks actually
play in strengthening local banking systems?1 In this
edition of Current Issues, we shed light on the effects of
foreign bank entry by comparing the financial condi-
tion and operating behavior of foreign and domestic
banks in Latin America in the years from 1995 through
2000.2This period provides useful case studies, because
many countries in the region experienced both a 
substantial increase in foreign ownership and signi-
ficant macroeconomic stress. Evidence that foreign
banks displayed distinctive strengths in these years
would suggest that foreign participation can indeed
benefit the financial systems of host countries.
Our analysis reveals that the overall financial condi-
tion and performance of foreign banks during the
period was on a par with that of private domestic banks.
Nevertheless, foreign banks showed higher average loan
growth, a more aggressive response to asset quality
deterioration, and greater loss-absorption capacity.
These behavioral differences suggest that foreign banks
may provide higher and more sustained credit flows
than their domestic counterparts. Thus, our findings
provide some support for the view that foreign owner-
ship strengthens emerging market financial systems. 
A Dramatic Increase in Foreign Ownership
Latin American financial systems changed dramati-
cally in the latter half of the 1990s in the wake of severe
banking crises. Regulatory limitations on foreign own-
ership were relaxed in many countries as banks coped
with substantial recapitalization needs and the local
banking sector sought to consolidate by privatizing
inefficient state banks and eliminating marginal institu-
tions. As a result, foreign banks now control majority
shares in nearly all of the larger Latin American finan-
cial systems, with the important exceptions of Brazil
and Colombia (Chart 1). These foreign banks—
January 2002 Volume 8  Number 1FRBNY 2
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
predominantly from Europe and North America, espe-
cially Spain and the United States—for the most part
have been highly rated and globally active institutions.3
The opening of Latin American financial systems to
foreign banks has been accompanied by broader finan-
cial sector reforms, including enhancements to deposit
insurance programs and the dedication of substantial
resources to strengthening bank supervision and regula-
tion. Measures implemented to enhance prudential
supervision and regulation include higher capital
requirements, more stringent loan classification and
provisioning standards, and increased disclosure
requirements. 
The full effects of this structural and regulatory
transformation on Latin American financial systems—
including its impact on the systems’ability to withstand
crises—are not yet known. However, it is useful to con-
sider the initial empirical evidence. Below we examine
differences in behavior across domestic and foreign
banks in order to assess whether foreign bank entry
might contribute to more robust financial systems in
Latin America. 
Data and Methodology 
We use two different—though related—quantitative
approaches to evaluate the soundness of individual
domestic and foreign banks within Latin American coun-
tries. The first approach focuses on bank ratings, single
composite measures of financial strength assigned to
individual institutions by a rating agency. The second
approach entails a more complex assessment of a number
of variables in individual banks’ financial statements.
Agency ratings are a useful broad measure, but they fail
to capture the particular strengths or weaknesses of indi-
vidual banks; the more detailed review of financial
statements makes it possible to identify specific opera-
tional and behavioral differences among banks.
Ratings-based analysis. The bank financial strength
ratings (BFSRs) issued by Moody’s Investors Service
are one frequently cited indicator of bank soundness.
BFSRs reflect Moody’s evaluation of financial strength
on a scale of A to E, with A representing the highest rat-
ing.4 Because Moody’s excludes from its calculations
both possible government support of domestic banks
and parent bank support of foreign-owned banks, the
ratings are designed to measure the intrinsic health of
domestic and foreign banks (Moody’s Investors Service
1995). The ratings also provide a relatively uniform
metric over time, facilitating cross-year comparisons. 
For our analysis, we track the change in Moody’s rat-
ings for sixty-seven domestic and foreign banks in
seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) from
1995 through 2000.5 In addition, we construct indexes
of the change in domestic bank ratings over the period
relative to the change in foreign bank ratings. These 
relative ratings changes adjust for the timing of bank
acquisitions and for events that could affect the ratings
of all banks within a country.
CAMEL analysis. Our second approach to evaluating
the soundness of domestic and foreign banks focuses on
balance sheet and behavioral indicators. More specifi-
cally, we follow the CAMEL-style method of analysis
commonly used by regulators to assess five elements of
a bank’s financial condition and performance: capital
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and 
liquidity. 
Within this framework, we examine banks in a subset
of Latin American countries, with countries selected
according to three criteria: a sufficient mixture of foreign
and domestic banks, data availability, and a recent period
of stress in the banking system. Argentina, Chile, and
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Chart 2
Distribution of Banks by BFSR Values, Year-End 2000
Percent 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ratings data from Moody’s Investors 
Service as of year-end 2000. 
Note: BFSR values are bank financial strength ratings assigned by Moody’s.foreign ownership in each country ranges from 20 to 
50 percent, regulators regularly publish detailed data,
and each country has experienced a recession that
adversely affected bank operating conditions. Our sample
consists of the twenty-five to thirty largest banks in each
country, capturing at least 80 percent of bank assets. We
consider retail-oriented institutions exclusively.
For our analysis, we use publicly available, institution-
specific data from supervisory authorities and Moody’s
Investors Service from 1997 to 2000 to calculate more
than twenty indicators of bank condition and perfor-
mance.6 These indicators cover balance sheet structure
and liquidity, asset quality, earnings, and capital. 
Comparing the results for foreign and domestic
banks. To compare the performance of foreign banks
with those of domestic banks, we sort the results of both
the ratings-based analysis and the CAMEL analysis by
type of bank ownership—foreign, private domestic, and
state-owned. In addition, we further divide foreign
banks into those that were acquired by foreign share-
holders since 1995 (“recently acquired foreign banks”)
and those that have maintained significant local opera-
tions at least since the early 1990s (“established foreign
banks”). For our comparisons of indicators, we use
unweighted averages within and across bank ownership
categories.7
Broad Similarities in Financial Condition 
The ratings-based analysis suggests that private foreign
and private domestic banks did not systematically differ
from each other in condition and performance over the
second half of the 1990s (Chart 2). It also shows that
private banks, regardless of ownership, were generally
healthier than state-owned banks. The ratings of gov-
ernment banks are clearly skewed toward the lower end
of the rating scale, while private domestic and foreign
banks have similar proportions of ratings in the D or
higher range.8
Our analysis of “absolute” and “relative” ratings
changes for recently acquired foreign banks and domes-
tic banks is somewhat more revealing. Although recently
acquired foreign banks, on average, showed little
improvement in their actual ratings over the period, on a
relative basis they withstood downgrades attributable to
broad financial and economic stress in these countries
more effectively than private  domestic banks. This 
foreign bank advantage is evident in cumulative relative
ratings gains of approximately one-half of a ratings
notch over those of private domestic banks.9
Evidence of Behavioral Differences 
More compelling differences across ownership types
emerge from the CAMEL-based comparisons of the
financial statements of individual banks in Argentina,
Chile, and Colombia. These differences are particularly
apparent in the areas of balance sheet structure, loan
growth, measures to address asset quality deterioration,
and loss-absorption capacity.
Foreign banks generally rely less on deposit-based
funding than private domestic banks, although both
groups maintain comparable shares of demand deposits.
This difference could stem from a variety of factors, but
better foreign bank access to alternative funding
sources is likely to be part of the explanation. Foreign
banks also maintain higher shares of liquid assets—a
reflection, perhaps, of their greater reliance on poten-
tially more volatile non-deposit borrowings. 
In all three countries, data through 2000 show aver-
age loan growth to be consistently higher for foreign
banks than for private domestic banks (Chart 3). This
result is consistent with findings by Dages, Goldberg,
and Kinney (2000) that in Argentina and Mexico, for-
eign and private domestic banks engaged in similar





























Loan Growth for Recently Acquired and Established 
Foreign Banks, 1997-2000
Percent 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on statistical information from local
bank regulators.financial condition was comparable), but foreign banks
showed stronger and less volatile loan growth overall.
The strength of foreign banks’ loan growth may reflect
their access to a broader and more diverse funding base. 
However, important distinctions in loan growth rates
are evident between those foreign banks with long-
standing local operations and the more recent entrants.
Between 1997 and 2000, established foreign banks
averaged stronger and more stable loan growth than
either recently acquired foreign banks or domestic
banks (Chart 4). The established banks, on average,
showed less reduction in credit growth when the local
economy weakened and higher loan growth when con-
ditions improved. By contrast, recently acquired foreign
banks exhibited more defensive behavior, expanding
their loan portfolios more slowly than domestic and
established foreign banks, and acquiring a higher share
of liquid assets. Such behavior suggests that the
recently acquired banks may have been attending to
more immediate needs—restructuring operations,
cleansing balance sheets, and integrating local opera-
tions with the parent bank—rather than pursuing market
share expansion and growth.10
A key issue to watch going forward is the extent to
which foreign and private domestic banks rely on dif-
ferent funding sources, and the associated implications
for loan growth stability. If foreign bank lending draws
on funding sources from the parent country, it may be
more vulnerable to macroeconomic deterioration at
home than in the emerging markets. Using data through
2000, Goldberg (2001) shows that movements in U.S.
bank lending to Latin American countries were more
closely tied to economic conditions in the parent coun-
try than to conditions in the host country; indeed, when
crises occurred in Latin America during this period,
U.S. lenders did not “cut and run.”11 With economic
slowdowns under way in the United States and Europe,
data releases for 2001 and into 2002 will reveal whether
the more robust lending by foreign banks in Latin
America withstands these slowdowns.
An evaluation of the quality of bank lending, as mea-
sured by the level and trend of nonperforming loan
ratios, is inconclusive. Ambiguous results, however,
may reflect traditional difficulties in evaluating bank
asset quality by outside analysts: definitions of problem
loans across countries often vary widely, and individual
banks within a country may apply the same standard
differently. 
Nevertheless, data on bank provisioning for bad
loans reveal systematic differences between foreign and
private domestic banks (Chart 5). Foreign banks had
higher loan provisioning expenses and comparable or
higher reserve coverage of nonperforming loans.
Together, these findings may suggest that foreign banks
had tighter credit review standards than domestic
banks. The higher average recoveries on charged-off
loans at foreign banks could also point to more inten-
sive or effective workout procedures, or simply to a
higher level of average charge-offs. Recently acquired
banks in particular took strong measures to address
potential losses, typically having reported higher initial
problem loan levels and correspondingly higher provi-
sioning and recoveries. Such actions were not exclusive
to the new foreign bank entrants absorbing weaker
institutions, however: established foreign banks—
which began the sample period with nonperforming
loan ratios similar to or lower than those of private
domestic banks—also provisioned more heavily than
their domestic counterparts. Overall, the data show that
foreign banks were more aggressive in addressing asset
quality deterioration.
At least in the short run, higher provisioning con-
tributed to generally weaker profitability at foreign
banks—an outcome reflected in lower returns on assets
(Chart 6). Foreign banks also had net interest margins
similar to or lower than those of domestic banks, and
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on statistical information from local
bank regulators.comparable or higher non-interest expense.12 Lower aver-
age net interest margins at foreign banks likely reflect
larger investments in lower-yielding liquid assets, but
could also reflect more expensive non-demand-deposit
financing. Higher non-interest expenses, meanwhile, may
be the result of short-term post-merger consolidation. 
Despite relative profit weakness, foreign banks con-
sistently maintained higher average risk-based capital
ratios than private domestic banks in all three countries
(Chart 7).13 This pattern is particularly notable in
Colombia, where foreign banks suffered losses through
2000. Higher foreign bank risk-based capital ratios
reflect relatively larger investments in liquid and lower-
risk assets. The combination of higher risk-based capital
ratios and lower capital-to-assets ratios for foreign banks
in Argentina and Colombia suggests that foreign banks
in these countries may also allocate capital in a way that
more closely mirrors the riskiness of their assets, and
hence may allocate this capital more efficiently. 
A Contribution to Banking System Soundness 
in Latin America 
Our analysis has revealed substantial similarities in the
financial strength and performance of foreign and 
private domestic banks in Latin America during the
period between 1995 and the end of 2000, with both
outperforming state-owned banks. Ratings data indicate
that local banks acquired by foreign shareholders fared
only marginally better than those banks that remained
under domestic control during recent periods of wide-
spread financial and economic stress. The lack of major
differences in overall performance suggests that strong
domestic and foreign banks can compete effectively in
local banking markets. 
Despite the broad similarities in the performance of
foreign and domestic banks, however, our more detailed
evaluation of bank financial statements in three Latin
American countries reveals significant behavioral 
differences. Foreign banks tended to maintain greater
asset liquidity and relied less on deposit financing. In
addition, foreign banks, particularly those with estab-
lished in-country operations, typically showed stronger
loan growth than private domestic banks, even during
periods of local economic difficulty. Although recently
acquired banks had weaker loan growth, their focus on
balance sheet repair could lay the foundation for future
credit growth at a pace much closer to that set by estab-
lished foreign banks. 
Across the board, foreign banks provisioned more
aggressively against bad loans and had higher loan recov-
ery rates. These actions point to tighter credit review
policies and practices. They are also suggestive of more
efficient overall financial intermediation, since banks
that take such precautions are able to identify weak cred-
its earlier and to reallocate their resources more quickly.
Although foreign banks as a group presented weaker
profitability profiles, they maintained higher risk-based
capital ratios than did private domestic banks. Foreign
banks seemed more willing to tolerate, or could better
afford, lower returns in the near term for the sake of
building longer-term institutional strength. Such an
approach signals a strong commitment to local markets. 
Our findings support the potential for foreign owner-
ship—at least from globally active and healthy parent
banks—to contribute to sounder and more stable banking
systems in emerging markets. Nevertheless, more exten-
sive analysis of these issues is clearly warranted. The
ownership changes in Latin America remain relatively
recent, and have taken place during a period when local
economic conditions have been difficult while home-
country conditions for foreign parent banks have been
strong. The competitive dynamics of substantially
increased foreign ownership in other macroeconomic set-
tings will be more fully revealed with the passage of time.
Notes
1. Since large-scale foreign bank entry into emerging markets is
relatively recent, the empirical evidence of its effects is only begin-
ning to emerge. One effect documented in several studies, however,
is that foreign entry contributes to greater competition for domesti-
cally owned banks, leading to lower local profit margins but also to
improved local bank efficiency. See especially Martinez-Peria and
Schmukler (1999). Related analyses appear in Burdisso, D’Amato,
and Molinari (1998); Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga
(1998); and Clarke, Cull, D’Amato, and Molinari (1999).
2. A more extensive discussion is provided in Crystal, Dages, and
Goldberg (2001). Throughout this analysis, banks are considered to
be foreign if foreign shareholders own a majority of voting shares or
exercise effective management control.
3. We do not conduct a systematic comparison of foreign banks
based on nationality. 
4. Ratings categories are defined by Moody’s as follows: A is
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on statistical information from local
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weak.” Distinctions among banks are also made by the assignment
of pluses and minuses to bank ratings. 
5. The financial strength ratings for banks in our sample were pro-
vided by Moody’s Investors Service. 
6. See Banco Central de la República Argentina, Estadisticas
Financieras; Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones
Financieras Chile, Información Financiera; Superintendencia
Bancaria de Colombia, Estadisticas Financieras; and Moody’s
banking statistical supplements for Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.
7. We use unweighted averages to evaluate the effects of foreign
ownership at the institutional level without giving consideration to
relative size. Thus, results should not be interpreted as precise indi-
cators of the level or trend of the overall condition and performance
of the banking sector. Moreover, bank financial results are prepared
in accordance with local accounting and regulatory standards and
are not necessarily comparable internationally or across the three
countries. Individual banks or ownership types may also apply exist-
ing standards more or less rigorously.
8. Between 1995 and 2000, no Latin American bank was rated
higher than C+ (considered “good” by Moody’s).
9. By way of example, a move from D to D+ represents one ratings
notch.
10. While we did not specifically control for size and associated
base effects, the loan portfolios of small foreign banks expanded
more rapidly than those of private domestic banks of comparable
size. Loan growth at larger foreign banks was slower than at domes-
tic peers, although this appears to reflect acquisition and merger-
absorption issues.
11. Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Palmer (2000) report similar
findings.
12. By contrast, foreign banks’ non-interest income levels as a per-
cent of total assets varied widely across the three countries, ranging
from relatively high in Chile (and much above those of domestic
banks), to low in Argentina (but comparable to domestic bank lev-
els). This result may reflect the relatively greater development of
Chilean financial markets, where foreign banks might be better able
to exploit comparative advantages in such areas as trading, invest-
ment banking, and asset management.
13. Risk-based capital ratios measure capital relative to assets
adjusted for credit risk. The countries under review have adopted
risk-based capital frameworks that are broadly consistent with the
Basel capital adequacy guidelines.
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